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I.  FINANCIAL LITERACY EDUCATION AS                                                  
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Families are losing their homes; during 2007, 2008, and 2009 alone, 
economists anticipate at least 2.5 million completed foreclosures in the 
United States.1  When it comes to health care, 42% of Americans are 
uninsured or underinsured.2  Annual bankruptcy filings, the overwhelming 
majority of which are consumer bankruptcies, march towards the one 
million mark.3  Retirement savings are at pitiful levels; over a third of 
workers have less than $10,000 in savings and nearly half have less than 
 
 1. In 2007, just over half a million foreclosures were completed.  BILL LONGBRAKE, 
HOPE NOW ALLIANCE SERVICERS, PRIME AND SUBPRIME RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES: 
2007 LOSS MITIGATION ACTIVITY 7 (2008), http://www.fsround.org/media/pdfs/National 
dataFeb.pdf.  In 2008 and 2009 collectively, economists expect at least two million more 
completed foreclosures.  JAMES LARDNER, DMOS, BEYOND THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN: 
ADDRESSING THE CURRENT CRISIS, AVOIDING A FUTURE CATASTROPHE 1 (2008), http://www. 
demos.org/pubs/housingpaper.pdf (referring to estimates by economist Mark Zandi).  To put 
this in some perspective, 2.5 million households would cover the entire population, renter and 
homeowner, of Massachusetts.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MASSACHUSETTS, FACT SHEET—
AMERICAN FACTFINDER (2005), http://factfinder.census.gov/ (in the “state” search bar, select 
“Massachusetts” and then click “GO”).  More recent projections have been more dire.  See
ROD DUBITSKY ET AL., CREDIT SUISSE, FORECLOSURE UPDATE: OVER 8 MILLION 
FORECLOSURES EXPECTED 1 (2008), http://www.chapa.org/pdf/ForeclosureUpdateCreditSuisse. 
pdf (projecting 8.1 million foreclosures over the next four years, meaning more than 16% 
of homeowners with a mortgage will lose their homes to foreclosure). 
 2. Cathy Schoen et al., How Many Are Underinsured? Trends Among U.S. 
Adults, 2003 and 2007, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE, June 10, 2008, at w300.
 3. News Release, U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Up in March (June 3, 2008), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2008/BankruptcyFilingsMar2008.cfm. 
WILLIS_FINAL_ARTICLE[1] 7/7/2009  4:53:42 PM 
[VOL. 46:  415, 2009]  Evidence and Ideology 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 417 
$25,000.4  Consumer testing reveals widespread ignorance of even basic 
financial concepts.5 
As the United States economy slides into recession, policymakers 
across the political spectrum grasp at one common explanation and 
solution: financial illiteracy and financial literacy education (FLE).  In 
the words of then-Federal Reserve Board Governor Frederic Mishkin: 
   There can hardly be a better time to make the case for economic and financial 
literacy than right now. . . .  [W]e face a downturn . . . fueled, at least in part, by 
unwise mortgage borrowing . . . . 
   . . . [A] better-informed citizenry would likely have resulted in more-prudent 
decision making and . . . less harm to the economy.6 
The embrace of FLE is not new.  It has enjoyed widespread public 
support in the United States going back to at least the 1930s.7  Many 
states require their schools to teach it, the federal government devotes 
financial and logistical resources to it, and financial institutions and 
community organizations offer it.8  When government agencies pursue 
financial services firms for violations of consumer protection statutes, 
 
 4. RUTH HELMAN ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., AMERICANS MUCH 
MORE WORRIED ABOUT RETIREMENT, HEALTH COSTS A BIG CONCERN 13 fig.10 (2008), 
http://www.ebri.com/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_04-2008.pdf. 
5. See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Baby Boomer Retirement 
Security: The Roles of Planning, Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth, 54 J. 
MONETARY ECON. 205, 215, 216 tbl.5 (2007) (reporting that over 80% of baby boomers 
approaching retirement could not correctly answer the following question: “Let’s say 
you have 200 dollars in a savings account.  The account earns 10 percent interest per 
year.  How much would you have in the account at the end of two years?”). 
 6. Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., The Importance of 
Economic Education and Financial Literacy, Speech at the Third National Summit on 
Economic and Financial Literacy (Feb. 27, 2008).  Accord President George W. Bush, 
Remarks by the President in Roundtable Interview with Business Reporters (Aug. 8, 
2007), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/09/ 
AR2007080900780_pf.html (stating in response to skyrocketing home foreclosure rates: 
“[T]here needs to be financial education measures in place.”); Bill Analysis, S.B. 1137, 
2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 11 (Cal. 2008) (“Finally, the stunning lack of financial 
literacy was a major contributing factor to the subprime crisis.”); Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No: 110-289 § 1132, 122 Stat. 2654, 2727 (2008) 
(providing funding for financial literacy education). 
 7. Leland J. Gordon, Book Review, 6 S. ECON. J. 403, 403 (1940). 
8. See LOIS A. VITT ET AL., FANNIE MAE FOUNDATION, PERSONAL FINANCE AND 
THE RUSH TO COMPETENCE: FINANCIAL LITERACY EDUCATION IN THE U.S. 13–14 (2000), 
http://www.isfs.org/rep_finliteracy.pdf. 
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financial education is frequently included as a component of any settlement 
agreement.9 
FLE is widely believed to turn consumers into responsible and 
empowered market players, motivated and competent to handle their 
own credit, insurance, savings, and investment matters by confidently 
navigating the marketplace.10  In this financially literate world, other 
forms of legal regulation of financial products are unnecessary and even 
counterproductive.11  This vision depends on the belief that FLE can 
not only improve financial behavior, but that it can do so to the degree 
necessary for consumers to protect and even increase their welfare in the 
modern financial marketplace. 
 
9. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, 10 Wall St. Firms Reach Settlement in Analyst 
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at A1 (stating that investment firms have agreed to 
settlement terms that include $80 million for investor education); Met Life to Pay Fine 
for a Sales Practice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1998, at B7 (explaining the settlement of 
claims alleging deceptive life insurance sale tactics includes money for consumer 
education); Press Release, Att’y Gen. of Pa., Attorney General Corbett Announces 
$200,000 Settlement in Lehigh Valley College Probe; Funds Will Support New 
Statewide Education Program for Consumer Credit Issues (Feb. 20, 2008), available at 
http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/press.aspx?id=3417 (“[T]he civil penalties and costs 
included in this settlement will be used to help launch a new statewide education 
program about consumer credit, helping every Pennsylvania family make wise choices 
about college financing, credit cards, home loans and other financial issues.”); Press 
Release, State of Cal., California Department of Corporations Announces Ameriquest 
Mortgage to Pay $325 Million and Undertake Compliance Reforms to Settle States’ 
Investigations (Jan. 23, 2006), available at http://www.corp.ca.gov/press/pdf/2006/ 
nr0601.pdf (announcing the settlement of predatory mortgage lending charges will 
include $30 million that states can use for, inter alia, financial literacy education). 
10. The State of Financial Literacy and Education in America: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 55 (2002) (statement of 
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/02_02hrg/020502/grnspan.htm. 
11. See, e.g., Calculated Risk: Assessing Non-Traditional Mortgage Products: 
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Housing and Transportation and S. Subcomm. on 
Economic Policy of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 
6 (2006) (prepared testimony of George Hanzimanolis, President-Elect, National 
Association of Mortgage Brokers), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ 
hanzimanolis.pdf. 
[C]onsumer education is the cornerstone of any effort geared to address the 
issues facing the mortgage industry today . . . .  No law or regulation should 
ever require any mortgage originator to supplant the consumer’s ability to 
decide for him or herself what is or is not an appropriate loan product.  As the 
decision-maker, the role of the consumer is to acquire the financial acumen 
necessary and take advantage of the competitive marketplace, shop, compare, 
ask questions and expect answers. 
Id.  See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-100, FINANCIAL LITERACY 
AND EDUCATION COMMISSION: FURTHER PROGRESS NEEDED TO ENSURE AN EFFECTIVE 
NATIONAL STRATEGY 1 (Dec. 2006) (“[F]inancial markets function best when consumers 
understand how financial services providers and products work and know how to choose 
among them.”). 
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Although this vision is seductive to conservatives and liberals alike, 
the necessary predicate belief in the efficacy of FLE is largely based on 
ideology rather than evidence.  The U.S. Financial Literacy and Education 
Commission, created to spearhead the federal government’s involvement 
in FLE, issued a 2006 report that makes claim after claim about what 
FLE can achieve, although it simultaneously observes that “there is little 
research on successful methods for financial education.”12 Financial 
literacy program advocates make their case by presenting lists of dire 
statistics about how little Americans know about financial matters and 
detailing how poorly they are managing their financial affairs.13  But 
they do not demonstrate that FLE will cure these ills.  Policymakers 
throw mandatory financial education and counseling at problems of 
bankruptcy and home mortgage foreclosures without proof that the 
education will help.14  Legal academics routinely suggest FLE as a solution 
to consumer personal finance problems; however, they assume FLE’s 
efficacy without evidence.15 
The resources spent on financial literacy education and the opportunity 
costs of pursuing financial literacy, rather than other public policies that 
might improve consumer financial conditions, call for empirical assessment 
of FLE’s effectiveness.  Although cited by policymakers as support for 
financial literacy initiatives,16 research to date has yet to produce 
 
 12. U.S. FIN. LITERACY & EDUC. COMM’N, TAKING OWNERSHIP OF THE FUTURE: 
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR FINANCIAL LITERACY xi (2006). 
13. See, e.g., JUMP$TART COAL. FOR PERS. FIN. LITERACY, MAKING THE CASE FOR 
FINANCIAL LITERACY—2008 (2008), http://www.jumpstart.org/fileindex.cfm. 
14. E.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 11 
U.S.C. § 1328(g)(1) (2006) (requiring FLE as a condition of consumer bankruptcy 
discharge); Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C.S. § 1701x 
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2008 amendments) (funding FLE with the goal of preventing 
foreclosures); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E (2000) (requiring FLE as a condition for 
obtaining a high cost home mortgage). 
15. E.g., Michael S. Barr, Access to Financial Services in the 21st Century: Five 
Opportunities for the Bush Administration and the 107th Congress, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 447, 460–61 (2002); Howell E. Jackson & Stacy A. Anderson, Can
States Tax National Banks to Educate Consumers About Predatory Lending Practices?, 
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 831, 880 (2007); Creola Johnson, Maxed Out College 
Students: A Call to Limit Credit Card Solicitations on College Campuses, 8 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 245 (2005). 
 16. For example, a bill introduced in the U.S. Congress claims: 
An evaluation by the National Endowment for Financial Education High 
School Financial Planning Program undertaken jointly with the United States 
Department of Agriculture Cooperative State Research, Education, and 
Extension Service demonstrates that as little as 10 hours of classroom 
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reliable, statistically significant evidence of effectiveness.  Past literature 
reviews generally have approached the subject with the goal of 
“Building the Case for Financial Education.”17  A 2007 review out of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Virginia, after recognizing many of the 
methodological problems in the existing research and without locating a 
single instance of replicated results, surprises the reader with the 
following: “Generally, we can conclude from this literature review that 
there is a need for financial education and that many existing approaches 
are effective.”18 
This Article aims to fill the gap in the literature by critically examining 
the studies commonly cited as evidence of the effectiveness of FLE.  By 
way of introduction, the Article sets forth the model underlying public 
and policymaker support for financial literacy programs today.  The 
Article’s critique of existing findings regarding FLE is paired with 
explanations of the barriers to better research.  The Article recommends 
further investigation of a number of alternative public policies suggested 
by the FLE studies.  The concluding section asks researchers to help 
 
instruction can impart substantial knowledge and affect significant change in 
how teens handle their money. 
A Bill to Promote Youth Financial Education, S. 925, 109th Cong., 2–3 (2005), 
apparently referencing Sharon M. Danes, Evaluation of the National Endowment for 
Financial Education High School Financial Planning Program 5 (2003–2004) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author, available at http://hsfpp.nefe.org/ 
loadFile.cfm?cont entid=273).  In his statement before a 2006 Senate hearing, Federal 
Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke cited: Abdighani Hirad & Peter Zorn, 
Prepurchase Homeownership Counseling: A Little Knowledge is a Good Thing, in LOW-
INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP: EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL 146, 146 (Nicholas 
Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2002); Marsha Courchane & Peter Zorn, Consumer 
Literacy and Creditworthiness 23, 25 (Apr. 7–8, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author), available at  http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2005_conf_paper_session3 
_courchane.pdf; Kimberly Gartner & Richard M. Todd, Effectiveness of Online “Early 
Intervention” Financial Education for Credit Cardholders 8, 15 (July 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/ 
2005_conf_paper_session3_todd.pdf; Gregory Elliehausen et al., The Impact of Credit 
Counseling on Subsequent Borrower Credit Usage and Payment Behavior 49–50 (Jan. 
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.chicagofed. 
org/cedric/files/2003_conf_paper_session1_staten.pdf [hereinafter Elliehausen et al. I].  
Improving Financial Literacy in the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (May 23, 2006) (statement of Ben S. 
Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board), available at http://banking.senate. 
gov/public/_files/bernankel. pdf.  All of these cited studies use data, methods, or 
measures that seriously undermine their conclusions, as explained further below. 
 17. Jonathan Fox et al., Building the Case for Financial Education, 39 J. 
CONSUMER AFF. 195, 195 (2005). 
 18. Matthew Martin, A Literature Review on the Effectiveness of Financial 
Education 22 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Working Paper No. 07-03, 2007), 
available at http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/working_papers/2007/ 
pdf/wp07-3.pdf. 
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policymakers and the public better understand the limits of empirical 
findings regarding the effectiveness of FLE. 
II.  THE IMPLICIT MODEL OF EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL                              
LITERACY EDUCATION 
Consumer financial education is conducted through classroom teaching, 
self-study materials, informational websites, interactive games, and the 
educational component of counseling.  Programs vary in content, audience, 
and methodology.  But they all aim to achieve welfare-enhancing financial 
behavior engaged in by consumers as the result of acquired financial 
literacy.  Such literacy requires both cognitive knowledge and skills and 
a well-calibrated degree of psychological confidence in that knowledge 
and those skills.  Hogarth has elaborated on the cognitive components as 
“being knowledgeable, educated, and informed on the issues of managing 
money and assets, banking, investments, credit, insurance, and taxes” 
and “understanding the basic concepts underlying the management of 
money and assets (e.g. the time value of money in investments and the 
pooling of risks in insurance).”19  Turning this cognitive literacy into 
positive action requires a particular degree of confidence—neither 
underconfidence,20 nor overconfidence.21 
Ultimately, FLE is only effective if it enables consumers, given their 
financial resource constraints, to make the decisions and to take the 
actions necessary for financial well-being today.22  Effectiveness must 
 
 19. Jeanne M. Hogarth, Financial Literacy and Family and Consumer Sciences, 94 
J. FAM. & CONSUMER SCI. 14, 15–16 (2002). 
20. E.g., Danes, supra note 16, at 2 (identifying boosting students’ confidence in 
their financial acumen as one goal of FLE). 
21. E.g., VITT ET AL., supra note 8, at 23 (asserting that overconfidence “costs 
consumers millions of dollars each year”); Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading 
Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual 
Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 774 (2000) (explaining that individual investors sufficiently 
confident to make frequent trades in their portfolio have lower returns).  Although little 
discussed in the FLE literature, research in behavioral economics indicates that even 
knowledge, skills, and well-calibrated confidence will not necessarily produce good 
financial decisions.  As I have discussed at length elsewhere, heuristics, biases, and 
emotional coping mechanisms that interfere with good decisionmaking are ubiquitous in 
personal finance.  See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 197, 226–48 (2008).  Policy measures designed to ameliorate consumer 
finance problems must address these behavioral barriers to better financial 
decisionmaking. 
 22. NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR FIN. EDUC., CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE 
AND BEHAVIOR: TURNING EDUCATION INTO ACTION 2 (2005), http://www.nefe.org/ 
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therefore be measured against the decisions and actions that our society 
and marketplace require. 
The demands of contemporary personal financial management are 
prodigious and varied.  A Federal Reserve Board consumer handbook 
explains that, in shopping for a home mortgage, “[t]o compare two 
ARMs [adjustable-rate mortgages] with each other or to compare an 
ARM with a fixed-rate mortgage, you need to know about indexes, 
margins, discounts, caps on rates and payments, negative amortization, 
payment options, and recasting (recalculating) your loan.”23  Retirement 
planning skills, including the ability to predict rates of return—even if 
“past performance is no guarantee of future results”24—are similarly 
complex.  A worksheet from the U.S. Department of Labor booklet Taking 
the Mystery Out of Retirement Planning, located on the following page, 
exemplifies the government’s expectations of consumer proficiency. 
Accompanying directions explain that for Column 1, the consumer 
must project future savings and asset purchases, and for Column 2, the 
consumer must select “a savings growth factor representing 3, 5, or 7 
percent rates of return, depending on how much you believe each of the 
worksheet items will increase in value.”25 
 
tabid/86/Default.aspx (follow “Closing the Gap Between Knowledge and Behavior” 
hyperlink). 
 23. BD. OF GOVERNORS, U.S. FED. RESERVE SYS., CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON 
ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES 4 (2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/arms/ 
armsbrochure.pdf. 
 24. MARK T. HEBNER, INDEX FUNDS: THE 12-STEP PROGRAM FOR ACTIVE 
INVESTORS 94 (2005) (“[S]ome variation of the disclaimer ‘past performance is no 
guarantee of future results’ must appear in all mutual fund advertisements and 
prospectuses . . . .”). 
 25. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TAKING THE MYSTERY OUT OF RETIREMENT PLANNING 
14, 47 (2006), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/nearretirement.pdf. 
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NEW SAVINGS BETWEEN NOW AND RETIREMENT                                  
SAVINGS GROWTH FACTORS FOR THREE SELECTED RATES OF RETURN 










Value of savings in 
10 years  
(Column 1 x Column 2) 
401(k) or 403(b)    
Keogh    
SEP-IRA    
SIMPLE IRA    
Other    
IRAs (traditional)    
IRAs (Roth)    
Other    
Home equity    
   Market value of    
  home 
   
   Mortgage and liens     
  (enter as positive        
  amount) 
   
Personal savings and   
investments 
   
Other assets  
(collections, etc.) 
   
TOTAL ASSETS    
 
Consumers with limited resources might never have a mortgage or 
own a 401(k), but mere budgeting may require them to make economic 
forecasts that elude experts because incomes in low-wage sector jobs can 
be uncertain and variable from one week to the next.26  These sectors 
 
 26. HEATHER BOUSHEY ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY & RESEARCH, UNDERSTANDING 
LOW-WAGE WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2007), www.inclusionist.org/files/lowwage 
work.pdf.  This is not to say that higher income consumers make more accurate 
forecasts, but typically their base income is less volatile.  See Daniel L. Tortorice, 
Unemployment Expectations and the Business Cycle 24–26 (Nov. 15, 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://people.brandeis.edu/~tortoric/Papers/ 
UnempExpBCFinal.pdf (finding that consumer expectations about unemployment reflect 
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also provide fewer employee benefits.27  Consequently, low-wage consumers 
need the literacy to shop for insurance and retirement savings vehicles 
on the open market, without the expertise or bargaining power of a 
human resources department. 
Some discussions of FLE assume that poor financial outcomes evidence 
“bad” financial behavior and that “good” decisions and behaviors always 
lead to good outcomes.28  But this is both too onerous and too weak a 
demand.  Resource constraints, job loss, disability, discrimination, and 
natural disasters can prevent consumers from enjoying good financial 
outcomes no matter how high their literacy and how welfare-enhancing 
their behaviors.  For example, paying bills late is generally classified as 
a “bad” financial behavior reflecting poor cash flow management skills.  
However, as Getter explains, “An unanticipated negative [income] shock 
can still reduce solvency and trigger delinquencies even for ‘financially 
responsible’ households that have accumulated precautionary wealth.”29  
Good financial outcomes, standing alone, are likewise not evidence of 
literacy or welfare-enhancing behaviors.  Given sufficient resources and 
a professional financial advisor, even the most spendthrift financial 
illiterate may experience good financial outcomes. 
Diagrammed, the model of effective FLE implicitly endorsed by 






III.  THE LIMITS OF EXISTING RESEARCH ON FINANCIAL                     
LITERACY EDUCATION 
Policymakers routinely cite a number of studies for the proposition 
that the financial literacy education model works.30  However, the 
academics who have performed this research generally do not make such 
 
recent past experience, such that they are overly optimistic at the beginning of a 
recession and overly pessimistic at the end of a recession, and that higher income and 
more education reduce these errors in expectations only slightly). 
 27. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-355, EMPLOYER-SPONSORED 
HEALTH AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS 9 (2007). 
 28. For example, studies that use credit report data to assess FLE such as 
Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, and Elliehausen et al. I, supra note 16, implicitly 
assume that the presence or absence of derogatory information recorded in a credit report 
is evidence of bad or good decisions and behaviors, respectively. 
 29. Darryl E. Getter, Contributing to the Delinquency of Borrowers, 37 J. 
CONSUMER AFF. 86, 99 (2003). 
 30. For examples, see supra note 16. 
 
Financial Education  Financial Literacy  Good Financial Decisions & Behavior  
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a sweeping claim.  Despite resourceful data collection methods, ingenious 
research designs, and rigorous statistical analysis techniques, researchers 
have been unable to overcome problems with data reliability, controls on 
conditions, measure validity, and interpretation of results.31 
A.  Data Reliability Issues 
1.  Self-Reports 
Research on FLE often relies on surveys in which consumers evaluate 
the education, assess their own knowledge, report their behaviors, reveal 
their financial condition, or recall their exposure to FLE.32  But responses to 
surveys conducted to evaluate FLE are vulnerable to social desirability, 
demand characteristic, and selective recall biases.  As explained below, 
each of these errors is likely to inflate estimates of the efficacy of FLE.  
Their cumulative effect indicates that relying on survey data to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of FLE is unsound. 
Survey data on any topic contains errors.  Sometimes errors are small 
and randomly distributed.  Other times, errors are large and systematic.  
When widespread social norms favor a particular behavior, consumers 
overreport engaging in that behavior.33  When respondents believe that 
administrators want a particular response, results are skewed in favor of 
that response.34  Misreporting can also reflect respondents’ misperceptions 
 
 31. This article does not catalog every weakness of every study; it sets forth the 
widespread weaknesses in the empirical work and provides selective examples of each.  
Most studies suffer from more than one such weakness. 
32. E.g., VITT ET AL., supra note 8, at 2, 7; Angela C. Lyons et al., Are We Making 
the Grade? A National Overview of Financial Education and Program Evaluation, 40 J. 
CONSUMER AFF. 208, 217 (2006). 
 33. Roger Tourangeau & Ting Yan, Sensitive Questions in Surveys, 133 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 859, 861 (2007) (discussing the problem of social desirability bias, which makes it 
“difficult or impossible” for researchers “to distinguish among (a) respondents who are 
actually highly compliant with social norms, (b) those who have a sincere but inflated 
view of themselves, and (c) those who are deliberately trying to make a favorable 
impression by falsely reporting positive things about themselves”). 
 34. Martin T. Orne, On the Social Psychology of the Psychological Experiment: 
With Particular Reference to Demand Characteristics and Their Implications, 17 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 776, 778 (1962) (discussing tendency of subjects to “behave in an 
experimental context in a manner designed to play the role of a ‘good subject’ or, in 
other words, to validate the experimental hypothesis”). 
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or unconscious biases favoring beliefs, recollections, or predictions 
about their own behavior consistent with self-concept.35 
In surveys taken at or after completion of a personal finance course, 
consumers on the whole report that the course was effective and that 
they will or already have improved their financial behavior.36  Demand 
characteristics render these responses suspect.  Consumers likely overreport 
the extent to which they are following their teachers’ instructions.  As 
the review out of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond notes, “[A]fter 
employees sit through over four hours of training, they are likely to say 
they learned something” and “they are likely to praise the company that 
provided the training as a courtesy, if nothing else.”37  Field data supports 
this conjecture; although Braucher’s analysis of an FLE program for 
bankruptcy debtors revealed a small negative effect on financial 
outcomes,38 the participants rated the classes highly.39 
The belief in the efficacy of FLE is propagated by the programs.  One 
of the first items in the American Homeowner Education and Counseling 
Institute’s “core curriculum” is “the importance of education.”40  When 
participation is voluntary, programs use “marketing techniques” to induce 
consumers to incur childcare and transportation costs and spend time 
 
 35. MARK L. MITCHELL & JANINA M. JOLLEY, RESEARCH DESIGN EXPLAINED 213–
15 (6th ed. 2007). 
36. See, e.g., Sissy Osteen et al., Financial Management Education: Its Role in 
Changing Behavior, 45 J. EXTENSION No. 3RIB2, at 4–5 (2007), available at 
http://www.joe.org/joe/2007june/rb2.shtml (presenting data reflecting self-reports of 
behavior change among participants in the Money 2000™ financial education program); 
Robert L. Clark et al., Retirement Plans and Saving Decisions: The Role of Information 
and Education, 5 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 45, 62 tbl.6 (2006) (presenting data on self-
reported expectations of future behavior change among recipients of retirement-related 
financial education); Richard L. Wiener et al., Debtor Education, Financial Literacy, 
and Pending Bankruptcy Legislation, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 347, 347 (2005) (presenting 
data reflecting self-reports of behavior change among bankruptcy debtors who received 
financial education); Danes, supra note 16, at 11 tbl.7, 14 tbl.10 (presenting data 
reflecting self-reports of positive behavioral changes among high school students who 
had participated in a financial literacy program). 
 37. Martin, supra note 18, at 14. 
 38. Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact 
on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 557, 578–79 (2001). 
39. Id. at 567, 585.  Cf. E. Bere et al., Outcome and Process Evaluation of a 
Norwegian School-Randomized Fruit and Vegetable Intervention, 21 HEALTH EDUC. 
RES. 258 (2006), available at http://her.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/21/2/258 
(explaining that although teachers rated a fruit and vegetable education program 
positively and students reported that they enjoyed it, the program failed in its goal to 
increase student fruit and vegetable intake). 
 40. Alan Mallach, Homeownership Education and Counseling: Issues in Research 
and Definition 23 tbl.5 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/community-development/publications/discussion-papers/ 
homeowner.pdf. 
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attending class rather than earning income.41  Regardless of whether these 
programs improve financial decisions and behavior, they may either 
convince participants to believe in FLE’s efficacy or screen out the 
nonbelievers at the first class. 
Misperception and overoptimism can also skew survey responses 
unidirectionally.  For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has 
reported results from its Financial Security in Later Life course: of 
nearly 50,000 Americans who attended the course and completed a 
survey, nearly 90% said that they “increased their financial knowledge.”42  
But comparing self-assessments to performance tests shows that 
consumers think that they learn more from FLE than they do.  In one 
experiment, well-educated consumers approaching retirement who were 
given financial training believed that their financial planning skills had 
improved.43  However, although they increased their factual knowledge, 
they did not increase their ability to make good financial decisions at a 
statistically significant level; they continued to overestimate retirement 
income by many years.44  Thus, consumer self-assessments must be taken 
as a measure of confidence—or overconfidence—rather than literacy. 
Society views many personal financial decisions and behaviors as 
having a normative valence, raising the problem of social desirability 
bias.  In anonymous surveys unconnected with FLE, Americans overstate 
their good financial habits and understate their poor habits.  For example, 
about 60% claim that they pay off their credit card balances in full every 
month, but card issuer data shows that the number is closer to 40%.45  In 
the Survey of Consumer Finances, families disclose on average about a 
third as much credit card debt as issuers report to the Federal Reserve.46 
 
 41. Margaret Clancy et al., Financial Education and Savings Outcomes in 
Individual Development Accounts 3 (Wash. Univ. Ctr. for Soc. Dev., Working Paper No. 
01-2, 2001), available at http://csd.wustl.edu/Publications/Documents/65.Financial 
EducationAndSavingsOutcomes.pdf. 
 42. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., COOP. STATE RESEARCH, EDUC., & EXTENSION SERV., 
FINANCIAL SECURITY IN LATER LIFE IMPACT REPORT 1 (2006), http://www.csrees 
.usda.gov/nea/economics/pdfs/fsll_impacts_jan06.pdf [hereinafter IMPACT REPORT]. 
 43. Douglas A. Hershey et al., Challenges of Training Pre-Retirees to Make Sound 
Financial Planning Decisions, 24 EDUC. GERONTOLOGY 447, 468 (1998). 
44. Id. 
 45. Larry Getlen, Why We Lie About Money and Debt, BANKRATE.COM, Apr. 28, 
2005, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/financial-literacy2004/debt-psychology.asp. 
 46. TAMARA DRAUT & JAVIER SILVA, DMOS, BORROWING TO MAKE ENDS MEET: 
THE GROWTH OF CREDIT CARD DEBT IN THE ‘90S 7, 10 (2003), http://archive.demos.org/ 
pubs/borrowing_to_make_ends_meet.pdf. 
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Financial literacy programs attempt to reinforce social messages to 
consumers about the desirability of engaging in particular financial 
behaviors.  With this in mind, consumers are likely to consciously or 
unconsciously exaggerate their behavioral change after FLE.  Mandell, 
who runs the Jump$tart Coalition’s annual nationwide test of high 
school seniors, has consistently found that—controlling for family 
income, intention to attend college, and other factors associated with 
differences in scores—students who have taken personal finance classes 
score no better on that test, but report higher levels of thriftiness than 
their peers.47 Although Mandell hypothesizes that the classes increase 
savings without increasing literacy, an explanation at least as plausible is 
that the classes affect self-reporting but not actual thriftiness.  Analyses 
of the effectiveness of the heavily promoted Money 2000™ and the 
National Endowment for Financial Education High School Financial 
Planning programs suffer from a similar reliance on self-reports of 
financial behaviors.48 
Bernheim and Garrett used self-reports of financial condition to 
conclude that workplace financial education stimulates savings.49  They 
concede that “education may [a]ffect reporting, rather than behavior,” 
but they argue that (a) if education causes people to inflate their savings 
behavior, then it should cause them to inflate their overall wealth and 
spouse savings behavior, and (b) their data does not show any correlation 
between education and reported wealth or spouse behavior.50  This assumes 
that only intentional misreporting inflates consumer responses to savings 
questions and that consumers possess sufficient financial literacy and 
forethought to inflate their savings and wealth numbers in a consistent 
manner.  In reality, social desirability bias could cause respondents 
unconsciously to report their intended or wishful savings behavior. 
Indeed, even if misreporting is conscious, people are not very consistent 
liars.  Bernheim and Garrett’s data suggest erroneous overreporting of 
retirement savings—8.8% of respondents stated higher rates of saving 
for retirement than rates of saving for all purposes.51  Further, financial 
issues are a major source of marital discord, and spouses typically disagree 
 
 47. Lewis Mandell, Financial Literacy—Does It Matter? 12 (Apr. 8, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.jumpstartcoalition.org/upload/ 
Mandell%20Paper%20April%202005.doc. 
 48. Osteen et al., supra note 36; Danes, supra note 16, at 2. 
 49. B. Douglas Bernheim & Daniel M. Garrett, The Effects of Financial Education 
in the Workplace: Evidence from a Survey of Households, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1487, 1489 
(2003). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 1515. 
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on the family’s income, wealth, and debt.52  Consumers exposed to FLE 
might inflate their own savings numbers in contrast to their spouses’ 
numbers. 
Studies that survey consumers about past participation in FLE to 
assess the relationship between FLE and outcomes may suffer from 
selective recall.  To estimate the effect of past education on current 
creditworthiness, Courchane and Zorn relied on data from a Freddie Mac 
survey that asked consumers whether they had learned about personal 
finance in courses or seminars.53  However, respondents who have 
experienced financial setbacks might answer that they had not “learned” 
from courses or seminars, and they might not even recall courses or 
seminars that they had attended.  Contrariwise, respondents who have 
experienced financial success would be prone to believe that they 
learned from FLE and to better recall having received FLE.  Analyses 
that rely on respondent recall of whether past employers offered 
financial education54 have the same weakness—selective recall is likely 
to distort estimates of FLE effectiveness upwards. 
2. Unrepresentative Samples 
No voluntary survey receives a perfect response rate.  When respondents 
do not systematically differ from nonrespondents, the response rate does 
not need to be high for the data to be valuable.  However, voluntary 
surveys of consumers who attend FLE classes are nigh destined to 
reflect a nonresponse bias, in that the sample that completes the surveys 
is unlikely to be representative of the population surveyed. 
Financial educators complain that surveys given at the completion of 
courses “are simply too long—unduly taxing program participants . . . 
[which] unnecessarily drives down response rates.”55  Participants who 
believe that they learned the most are likely to complete the survey at 
 
 52. Jay L. Zagorsky, Husbands’ and Wives’ Views of the Family Finances, 32 J. 
SOCIO-ECON. 127, 127 (2003). 
 53. Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, at 2. 
54. E.g., Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Retirement 
Planning: New Evidence from the Rand American Life Panel 5 (Univ. of Mich. Ret. Res. 
Ctr., Working Paper No. 2007-157, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1095869. 
 55. Lyons et al., supra note 32, at 218. 
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higher rates, whether out of a sense of pride or reciprocity.56  The net 
effect is to inflate the results in favor of finding FLE to be effective. 
The population that completes follow-up surveys is no doubt even less 
representative.  Wiener and his colleagues, in their experimental testing 
of the efficacy of FLE given to bankruptcy debtors, ran into this problem.  
For the test instrument that the experimenters sent three months after 
conducting financial training sessions, response rates varied dramatically; 
for debtors who received the training the response rate was 34%, for 
debtors who did not receive the training it was 56%, and for nondebtors 
it was 71%.57  Those who had participated in the program—who, if they 
felt it had helped them, would have had the most motivation to complete 
the survey, but who also would be the most embarrassed to report not 
having changed their behavior—were the least likely to respond. 
The National Endowment for Financial Education advertises that three 
months after completing its ten-hour High School Financial Planning 
Program, over half the students improved their spending and saving habits.58  
However, only 17% of the students responded, meaning that about 10% 
of the students who completed the program reported improved financial 
habits.59  Because those who, accurately or inaccurately, believe that they 
improved their behavior have more impetus to report their improvement, 
it is plausible that few nonrespondents saw any improvement.  Further, 
high school students who voluntarily complete and return a survey three 
months after a program might be unusually approval-seeking and obedient, 
personality traits predisposing them to exaggerate good behavior. 
Given the likelihood that response rates are biased, it is not possible to 
conclude from studies with low response rates that FLE changed 
participant financial decisions and behavior. 
3. Barriers to Better Data Collection Methods 
If survey data is so unreliable, and those who complete them 
unrepresentative, why do academics use these sources?  Why do researchers 
 
56. Cf. Christiane Spitzmüller et al., Survey Nonrespondents as Bad Soldiers: 
Examining the Relationship Between Organizational Citizenship and Survey Response 
Behavior, 15 INT’L J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 449, 450 (2007) (finding that survey 
respondents had more courteous personalities and a stronger sense of reciprocal social 
obligations to others than nonrespondents); Steven G. Rogelberg et al., Profiling Active 
and Passive Nonrespondents to an Organizational Survey, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1104, 
1111–12 (2003) (finding that intentional decisions not to respond to surveys were caused 
by dissatisfaction with the entity performing the survey and that unintentional failures to 
respond were caused by a lack of conscientiousness). 
57. See Wiener et al., supra note 36, at 353. 
 58. Danes, supra note 16, at 16. 
59. Id. at 6. 
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not objectively test financial knowledge and skills before and after finance 
courses?  Why do they not track consumer decisions and behavior before 
and after FLE through longitudinal observation? 
Educators explain that their clients do not want to be tested.  The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture Cooperative Extension Service warns teachers of 
its Financial Security in Later Life course that if they attempt to evaluate 
the program by giving tests, “some adult audiences may be turned off by 
having to take a ‘test,’ and choose not to continue participation in the 
program.”60  Educators are unlikely to permit testing of their students for 
fear of deterring participation.  If researchers did test students, the 
manipulation might create attrition bias; consumers who withdrew to 
avoid testing would differ from those who continued with the course, 
and these differences would probably correlate with factors that affect 
outcomes.61 
Tracking financial behavior is even more difficult.  Because we generally 
do not know who will participate in FLE in the future, academics can 
view pre-FLE behavior only retrospectively, when the consumer’s memory 
has faded or has been distorted by ensuing events.  Direct observation of 
consumer decisionmaking after FLE, were it logistically possible, would 
alter behavior.  Decisions are therefore usually observed only after they 
are made, in effect observing outcomes rather than behavior.  However, as 
discussed above, outcomes are influenced by more than behavior, and 
behavior is not always accurately reflected in outcomes.  In addition, 
consumers frequently find surveys about their finances invasive and will 
not answer the questions.62 
One way to increase consumers’ willingness to be tested and to respond 
to follow-up surveys would be to provide incentives for them to do so.  
However, as the next section explains, such incentives can introduce the 
problem of confounds.63 
 
 60. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. COOP. STATE RESEARCH, EDUC., & EXTENSION SERV., 
FINANCIAL SECURITY IN LATER LIFE, TOOLS FOR EDUCATORS, http://www.csrees.usda.gov/  
nea/economics/fsll/edu_intro.html (follow “Program Evaluations and Accountability” 
hyperlink; then follow “FSLL Eval Tools and Ideas—Participant Changes” hyperlink). 
 61. Paul N. Bloom & Gary T. Ford, Evaluation of Consumer Education Programs, 
6 J. CONSUMER RES. 270, 272 (1979). 
62. See Lyons et al., supra note 32, at 219. 
 63. To avoid the biases inherent in surveys and to obtain longitudinal data, some 
researchers, using exacting procedures to maintain consumer anonymity, have managed 
to obtain credit bureau reports and credit scores.  E.g., Gregory Elliehausen et al., The 
Impact of Credit Counseling on Subsequent Borrower Behavior, 41 J. CONSUMER AFF. 1, 
3 (2007) [hereinafter Elliehausen et al. II]; Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, at 3–4.  
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B.  Research Design Issues 
1.  Confounds 
Financial education is frequently bundled with other forms of assistance, 
in part to encourage participation in FLE.  As a result, the contribution 
of the education to any changes in participant behaviors is uncertain.  
Programs that provide financial assistance with their classes may lead to 
better outcomes due to the former rather than the latter.64  For example, 
the American Dream Demonstration project conducted an FLE program 
for low-income consumers and gave the participants one to seven dollars 
for every dollar that they saved,65 obscuring the effect of the FLE component 
of the project.  Studies of FLE coupled with homebuyer down payment 
assistance or reduced mortgage interest rates suffer from the same problem.66 
Confounding assistance need not be tangible.  Financial counseling 
may improve financial outcomes due to noneducative components of the 
process rather than any change in literacy.  “Counseling” includes actions 
that counselors take on behalf of their clients.  Some homeownership 
counselors admit that their interventions on behalf of consumers are more 
effective than their interactions with consumers.67  Credit counselors can 
negotiate payment plans that reduce interest rates, fees, and minimum 
payments.68  Counselor intervention can alleviate consumer stress, which 
may improve health and increase employability and productivity, potentially 
increasing income69 without increasing financial literacy. 
Merely disputing errors on a client’s credit report can have an effect.  
About half of the sixteen million credit reports sent to consumers each 
year result in a question or dispute, and of the formal disputes lodged, 
over half result in a change to the credit report.70  Results of studies that 
 
But measuring FLE efficacy through credit report and score changes is problematic for 
reasons discussed in Part III.C.3, infra. 
 64. Mallach, supra note 40, at 7–8. 
 65. MARK SCHREINER ET AL., WASH. UNIV. CTR. FOR SOC. DEV., SAVING 
PERFORMANCE IN THE AMERICAN DREAM DEMONSTRATION: A NATIONAL DEMONSTRATION OF 
INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTS 3 (2002), http://csd.wustl.edu/Publications/Documents/ 
ADDReport2002.pdf. 
66. See Roberto G. Quercia & Susan M. Wachter, Homeownership Counseling 
Performance: How Can It Be Measured?, 7 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 175, 185, 196 (1996) 
(discussing this methodological problem with studies of homeownership counseling 
efficacy). 
 67. Mallach, supra note 40, at 11. 
 68. Elliehausen et al. I, supra note 16, at 2. 
 69. Jinhee Kim et al., Relationships Among Credit Counseling Clients’ Financial 
Well Being, Financial Behaviors, Financial Stressor Events, and Health, 14 FIN. 
COUNSELING & PLAN. 75, 84 (2003). 
70. The Accuracy of Credit Report Information and the Fair Credit Reporting Act: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 21 
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use credit bureau reports and credit scores to assess outcomes could 
reflect counselor-initiated changes in the credit report data rather than 
consumer changes in behavior, skewing results toward findings that 
policymakers interpret as evidence that FLE works.71 
Even when they do not take actions on behalf of clients, counselors 
and teachers in small class settings can give consumers personalized advice 
and written action plans.  Compliance with these specific instructions 
might improve finances regardless of whether the consumer increases 
financial literacy in the process. For example, because “[t]he first 
requirement for credit counseling clients is to cut up all their credit cards 
and close the accounts,”72 all but the noncompliant consumers who 
attend counseling should close these accounts.  Findings of investigations 
that use a reduction in the number of open accounts as evidence of 
improved financial behavior73 could reflect counselor persuasiveness and 
consumer obedience rather than any effect of FLE. 
A frequently cited analysis by Hirad and Zorn of participants in 
Freddie Mac’s Affordable Gold mortgage program found that, controlling 
for selection effects, classroom-based homeownership counseling 
significantly reduced mortgage delinquency rates.74  Without testing 
consumer knowledge, the title of their paper attributes these good outcomes 
to “knowledge” gained through the counseling.  But in the text, the 
authors also note: “Counseling is specific and tailored to the particular 
needs of the individual . . . .  Classroom counseling also can fall into this 
category because, although it is administered to a group of borrowers, it 
too can give borrowers personal attention . . . .”75  It is therefore plausible 
that these consumers received direct assistance and personal financial 
advice, and that following instructions, rather than changes in knowledge, 
contributed to the reduction in delinquency rates. 
Elliehausen, Lundquist, and Staten compared credit reports of consumers 
who had received counseling with credit reports of consumers who had 
 
(2003) (statement of Stuart K. Pratt, President, Consumer Data Industry Association), 
available at http://banking.senate.gov/03_07hrg/071003/pratt.pdf. 
71. E.g., Elliehausen et al. II, supra note 63, at 7 (using Emprica credit scores as a 
“comprehensive and objective measure of creditworthiness” to measure changes in 
behavior).  Problems with using credit reports and credit scores are discussed further in 
Part III.C.3, infra. 
 72. Kim et al., supra note 69, at 77. 
 73. Elliehausen et al. II, supra note 63, at 26–27. 
 74. Hirad & Zorn, supra note 16, at 162–63. 
75. Id. at 148. 
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not, controlling for a number of other factors, and found that counseled 
consumers experienced comparatively more improvement in creditworthiness 
during the three years subsequent to the counseling dates.76  They self-
published a monograph preliminarily attributing their results to “financial 
education conducted in a one-on-one setting.”77  This 2003 monograph is 
widely cited by policymakers even today as evidence of the effectiveness of 
FLE.78  But because the study did not limit the treatment to education, 
the 2007 version of this paper—published in a peer-reviewed journal—
concludes only that any greater improvement in credit standing experienced 
by counseled consumers is “associated with” counseling.79  As the authors 
implicitly recognize, financial changes that they had earlier attributed 
to FLE could have been caused by confounding factors. 
A variant on this problem was spotted by Braucher in her analysis of 
the effects of mandatory FLE on bankruptcy debtors.  Before the passage 
of the 2005 bankruptcy law requiring all consumer debtors to receive 
FLE,80 some bankruptcy districts required FLE and some did not.  Braucher 
compared debtors in the former with those in the latter, controlling for a 
variety of other ways in which the populations of consumer bankruptcy 
debtors might differ among districts.81  At first blush, the data seemed to 
indicate that FLE made a difference—debtors in the districts requiring 
the education program were more likely to complete their bankruptcy 
debt repayment plans successfully.  But on closer analysis, Braucher 
determined that the districts requiring the classes also created conditions 
that made it easier for debtors to complete their plans.  Judges in these 
districts approved more lenient payment plans and more frequently 
required payments under those plans to be deducted directly from the 
consumers’ paychecks—a self-control mechanism rather than education.82  
 
 76. Elliehausen et al. I, supra note 16, at 50. 
77. Id. at 6.  Other work of the Credit Research Center has been criticized for 
methodological problems and erroneous assumptions consistently biasing the Center’s 
results in favor of the credit industry.  For examples, see Elizabeth Warren, The Market 
for Data: The Changing Role of Social Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 
1, 11–15, 18–19, 41, and sources cited therein. 
78. E.g., Bernanke, supra note 16; Financial Literacy and Education: The 
Effectiveness of Governmental and Private Sector Initiatives: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 5 & n.1 (2008) (statement of Sandra F. 
Braunstein, Director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, U.S. Federal 
Reserve System), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/hearing110/braunstein 
041508.pdf.; Fox et al., supra note 17, at 201; Kim et al., supra note 69, at 76. 
 79. Elliehausen et al. II, supra note 63, at 27. 
 80. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 11 
U.S.C. § 1328(g)(1) (2006). 
 81. Braucher, supra note 38, at 558. 
82. Id. 
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Once these differences among districts were controlled for, “[e]ducation 
resulted in a small, significant and negative effect” on outcomes.83 
Similarly, in a study of FLE provided to members of the military, 
simple bivariate analyses seemed to show that soldiers who had received 
FLE training engaged in slightly better financial behaviors than soldiers 
who had not received the training.  The soldiers who received the FLE 
were relatively more likely to participate in the government’s retirement 
savings plan and less likely to buy worthless “life insurance” products 
marketed to soldiers.84  However, once controls were added for other factors 
such as pay grade, education, and marital status, no positive behaviors 
were associated with having taken the course.  To the contrary, soldiers who 
had received the financial training were, ceteris paribus, more likely to 
use informal rather than formal budgeting than soldiers who had not 
taken the class.85 
These two studies of FLE, provided in the particular settings of 
bankruptcy and the military, do not prove that FLE is harmful or 
ineffective, but they do demonstrate the susceptibility of analyses of the 
effectiveness of FLE to an upward bias due to confounds.  Studies that 
do not control for potential confounds are not probative evidence 
regarding FLE’s effects. 
2.  Inadequate Controls 
The biggest methodological problem that undermines the results of 
FLE efficacy studies has been the lack of adequate controls needed to 
 
83. Id. at 578. 
 84. Catherine Bell et al., Does Financial Education Affect Soldiers’ Financial 
Behaviors? 2 (Feb. 18, 2009) (draft paper, 2009 Federal Reserve System Community 
Affairs Research Conference).  The authors claim that their bivariate results demonstrate 
a number of other improvements in financial behavior, id. at 1–2, but all of these suffer 
from very serious problems, even absent controls.  Most lack statistical significance.  A 
few, such as comparison shopping for major purchases, were behaviors that the group 
who received the education was already doing better than the comparison group prior to 
the education, and in one case—paying off credit card bills in full—the group who 
received the education only went downhill after the course.  Id. at 9 tbl.5, 13 tbl.11.  In 
addition, although the authors cite decreased use of car title loans as an improvement in 
financial behavior, id. at 14 tbl.12, these loans were effectively outlawed for members of 
the military during the study period such that the “improvement” in lowered use of car 
title loans cannot be attributed to financial education.  See Talent Amendment to the 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. 109-364, sec. 670(a), § 987(b), 120 Stat. 2266, 
2266 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (effective Oct. 1, 2007)). 
85. Bell et al., supra note 84, at 19 & tbl.16. 
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demonstrate the causal links from education to literacy to financial 
decisions and behaviors.  Consumers generally cannot be forced to take 
FLE courses.  Therefore, the treatment group that academics must use 
consists of consumers who choose to receive FLE.  Common sense suggests 
many unobserved ways in which these consumers differ from those who 
do not participate.  In addition to being better informed or more 
motivated,86 those who attend may have more free time for researching 
and making financial decisions or less embarrassment and denial about 
personal finance problems or “bad” decisions that they made in the past. 
A number of studies support this intuition.  College students who 
completed an online version of VISA’s Practical Money Skills for Life 
course had better financial behaviors than students who were offered but 
declined the course, but the former were on average already wealthier, 
more educated, and more creditworthy.87  In the Elliehausen, Lundquist, 
and Staten study’s raw data, credit counseling produced a 66 point 
average increase in credit scores of debtors who had low scores prior to 
the counseling—a large change amounting to a 30% reduction in 
predicted likelihood of bankruptcy.88  However, after applying statistical 
techniques to reduce selection effects, the authors discovered that 
counseling produced less than a single point increase in credit score, 
indicating that selection, not FLE, was probably responsible for the 
higher credit scores of counseled consumers.89  Further, the statistical 
technique that they used, a two-stage least squares regression, can 
significantly reduce, but cannot eliminate, selection effects.90 
Most data sets containing information on FLE and financial outcomes 
provide no reliable way to control for selection effects.  For example, the 
Health and Retirement Study contains data on households whose heads 
are between fifty and sixty-one years of age.91  Approximately 10% of 
the households in that study stated that they had attended an employer-
sponsored meeting on “retirement planning,” although they gave no 
indication of when this meeting took place.92 Using this data set to 
evaluate FLE, Lusardi found that the households who reported attending 
a retirement planning meeting had saved more for retirement, controlling 
 
 86. Bernanke, supra note 16, at 3. 
 87. Gartner & Todd, supra note 16, at 9. 
 88. Elliehausen et al. II, supra note 63, at 25. 
89. Id. at 18. 
 90. James Heckman et al., Characterizing Selection Bias Using Experimental 
Data, 66 ECONOMETRICA 1017, 1071 (1998). 
91. See Annamaria Lusardi, Saving and the Effectiveness of Financial Education, 
in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 157, 172 
(Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004). 
92. Id. at 164, 165 tbl.9-4 (506 out of 5292 respondents stated that they attended a 
meeting on retirement). 
WILLIS_FINAL_ARTICLE[1] 7/7/2009  4:53:42 PM 
[VOL. 46:  415, 2009]  Evidence and Ideology 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 437 
for variables such as demographics and income, and concluded that 
“financial education can boost saving, particularly for those with low 
financial literacy.”93  But consumers who attended these meetings might 
have saved just as much without attending.  Perhaps they accumulated 
their savings prior to the meeting and attended to learn how to plan their 
drawdown rates during retirement.  Although the study used an impressive 
number of controls, without an instrumental variable that affects attendance 
at FLE but does not affect the dependent variable—here, savings—
controlling for selection when subjects attend FLE voluntarily may not 
be possible. 
Supporting their conclusion that increased financial literacy positively 
affects financial behavior, Lusardi and Mitchell find that consumers who 
score higher on tests of financial knowledge report having thought more 
about retirement.94  To address endogeneity effects—the possibility that 
the financial planning led to the financial literacy—the study uses as an 
instrumental variable consumer self-reports on how much of their 
education, including high school, college, or higher degrees, was devoted to 
economics.  Having devoted “a lot” of their coursework to economics 
has a strong correlation with financial literacy in this sample, providing 
some support for the authors’ point that the planning did not cause the 
literacy.95 
However, even absent an endogeneity effect, selection effects are still 
likely.  The dataset that Lusardi and Mitchell use—one of the best 
datasets collected in this area—does not allow them to demonstrate that 
having devoted a lot of schooling to economics is not correlated with 
omitted variables that affect retirement planning.96  Yet it is plausible 
that the same personality traits that lead consumers in their youth to 
choose “a lot” of economics coursework independently lead the same 
consumers in adulthood to plan more for retirement.  Preliminary 
research on determinants of success in economics courses indicates that 
students who are goal-oriented and make detailed plans perform better.97  
 
93. Id. at 157. 
 94. Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 54, at 14. 
95. Id. at 14–15. 
96. See id. at 15 (suggesting only that economics education is an “arguably exogenous 
instrument[]”). 
97. E.g., Kurtis J. Swope & Pamela M. Schmitt, The Performance of Economics 
Graduates over the Entire Curriculum: The Determinants of Success, 37 J. ECON. EDUC. 
387, 392 (2006); Andrea L. Ziegert, The Role of Personality Temperament and Student 
Learning in Principles of Economics: Further Evidence, 31 J. ECON. EDUC. 307, 310, 
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It seems plausible that success leads to enrollment in more economics 
courses, and that the same personality traits that lead to classroom 
success lead to more planning for retirement. 
In what appears to be the only direct examination of self-selection in 
this context, Meier and Sprenger found that consumers who chose to 
participate in FLE differed sharply from those who did not.98  Their 
experiment offered over 800 low-to-moderate-income consumers waiting in 
line for income tax assistance a free fifteen-minute credit counseling 
session.99  Testing revealed that those who accepted the offer had 
significantly lower financial discount rates—meaning that they were 
more willing to wait for a larger financial reward in the future rather 
than taking a smaller reward sooner—than those who declined.100  
Consumers who accepted also had relatively more education and prior 
financial knowledge, although even controlling for these, discount rates 
remained significant.101 
Those who declined the credit counseling session were surely 
influenced by other unmeasured factors, such as a preference for privacy 
rather than allowing a stranger to see one’s credit report or a desire not 
to be confronted with one’s past credit problems.  But the authors’ 
conclusion—that consumers who choose to participate in FLE concern 
themselves more with the future and so are likely to engage in relatively 
more welfare-enhancing financial behavior even absent any participation 
in FLE102—remains plausible.  Given that the “class” in the experiment 
required so little time and effort, a real FLE course might be expected to 
show stronger selection effects. 
In sum, self-selection poses a significant problem for much FLE 
research, one that likely biases estimates of the effectiveness of FLE 
upwards. 
3.  Barriers to Better Research Design 
A number of researchers have eliminated much of the bias created by 
individual self-selection by focusing on settings where FLE is 
exogenously set.  Bernheim and Garrett, in their workplace financial 
education research—critiqued above for reliance on self-reports about 
 
319 (2000).  This is the “judging” personality type indicator of the Meyers-Briggs scale.  
Id. at 308. 
 98. Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Selection into Financial Literacy Programs: 
Evidence from a Field Study 9–11 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Discussion Paper No. 
07-05, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1073158. 
99. Id. at 5. 
100. Id. at 9–10. 
101. Id. at 11. 
102. Id. at 12–13. 
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personal savings—did not compare employees who participated in FLE 
programs with those who did not.103  Instead, to eliminate the biasing effect 
of self-selection, they compared employees at workplaces that offered 
retirement education and planning assistance with employees at 
workplaces that did not.104  In their investigation of the effects of high 
school FLE, described further below, Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki 
examined differences between consumers who had attended high school 
in states that mandated financial education and those who had lived in 
states that did not.105  That some employees and students in workplaces 
and schools that did not offer or require FLE must have received FLE, 
and that some employees in workplaces that offered FLE certainly did 
not receive FLE, should drive their estimates of the effectiveness of FLE 
downward. 
However, although this methodology can eliminate self-selection 
problems, it does not create true controls.  Workplaces that offer financial 
education and advice are not controlled settings in which employees are 
otherwise exposed to the same conditions as employees in workplaces 
not offering these services.  States with financial education mandates 
cannot be kept identical in all other relevant respects to states without 
mandates.  Given differing economic conditions across states and firms, 
omitted variable bias is likely.  In fact, recent work attempting to replicate 
Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki’s study of the effect of state financial education 
mandates, using a data set several orders of magnitude larger, found that 
states imposed mandates at times when they were experiencing high 
economic growth, and that increased savings and investment rates correlated 
with economic growth, not with the imposition of state financial 
education mandates.106 
Nonexperimental designs cannot prove causality in the social sciences.107  
Randomized experiments are not always possible, forcing researchers to 
rely on observational or survey data.  But comparisons between results of 
nonexperimental and experimental research consistently demonstrate 
 
 103. Bernheim & Garrett, supra note 49, at 1493–94. 
104. Id. 
 105. B. Douglas Bernheim et al., Education and Saving: The Long-Term Effects of 
High School Financial Curriculum Mandates, 80 J. PUB. ECON. 435, 442 (2001). 
 106. Shawn Cole & Gauri Kartini Shastry, If You Are So Smart, Why Aren’t You 
Rich? The Effects of Education, Financial Literacy and Cognitive Ability on Financial 
Market Participation 20–21 (Nov. 2008) (draft paper, 2009 Federal Reserve System 
Community Affairs Research Conference). 
 107. MITCHELL & JOLLEY, supra note 35, at 112. 
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that findings from the former deviate—sometimes quite substantially—
from the latter.  For example, a recent article compared the findings of 
three different research designs used to determine the effect of get-out-
the-vote phone calls on voter turnout.  The randomized experiment found 
no increase in voter turnout, whereas regression analysis and matching 
estimation found a large and significant increase.108  Another article compared 
experimental and nonexperimental analyses of the impact of, for example, 
job training programs, and found that nonexperimental studies often 
produced results that differed from experimental results by “policy-
relevant margins.”109  As Caskey has argued, “[T]hese results alone 
should raise doubts about the ability of non-experimental studies, even 
when conducted in a very conscientious manner, to measure accurately 
the impact of [financial] education.”110 
Societal pressures and institutional review boards beyond the control 
of researchers prevent most from engaging in randomized experiments 
that could eliminate confounds and establish a proper control group for 
comparison.  Analyses of consumer education have long wrestled with 
the problem that “program administrators find it socially unacceptable to 
withhold an educational treatment from any individuals.”111  For example, if 
a high school offers a personal finance course, educators are unlikely to 
allow researchers to assign randomly one group of students to the 
treatment group—meaning required to take the course—and another 
group of students to the control group—meaning prohibited from taking 
the course.  For these reasons, it is extremely difficult to find naturally 
occurring FLE settings that can be used to determine the efficacy of FLE. 
The first wave of results from the one ongoing study that appeared 
likely to surmount these research design barriers is discouraging.  The 
Federal Reserve Board conducted a multiyear study to determine the 
effectiveness of FLE given to members of the armed services.112  The 
military is in a unique position.  In theory, it could randomly assign its 
members to control and treatment groups, and mandate participation in 
follow-up surveys so as to eliminate selection and nonresponse biases. 
However, neither random assignment nor required participation in the 
follow-up survey appears to have occurred in this study.  Soldiers were 
 
 108. Kevin Arceneaux et al., Comparing Experimental and Matching Methods 
Using a Large-Scale Voter Mobilization Experiment, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 37, 55 (2006). 
 109. Steven Glazerman et al., Nonexperimental Versus Experimental Estimates of 
Earnings Impacts, 589 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 63, 63 (2003). 
 110. John P. Caskey, Can Personal Financial Management Education Promote 
Asset Accumulation by the Poor? 5 (Ind. State Univ. Networks Fin. Inst., Policy Brief 
No. 2006-PB-06, 2006). 
 111. Bloom & Ford, supra note 61. 
 112. Bernanke, supra note 16, at 8; Lynn Fox & Joy Hoffman, Federal Reserve 
Personal Financial Education Initiatives, 2004 90 FED. RESERVE BULL. 447, 451 (2004). 
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“offered” FLE rather than randomized into treatment and control groups, 
and completing the follow-up was optional.113  The researchers obtained 
follow-up data on less than 4% of the subjects in their treatment 
group.114  Further, comparing the treatment group’s behaviors at the time 
of the FLE and at follow-up is problematic because many became 
married and gained some college education or a college degree between 
the time of the FLE and their follow-up survey, and both of these might 
cause a financial behavior change.115  Moreover, as explained above, at 
follow-up some time after the course, the study found worse financial 
behaviors among soldiers who received the FLE training than among 
soldiers who did not participate in the FLE, controlling for other 
variables affecting financial behavior.116 
C.  Measurement Issues 




To empirically evaluate the model, researchers must employ measures 
of the following: exposure to financial education, financial literacy 
levels, and the quality of financial decisions and behavior.  To validate 
this particular model, they must demonstrate that any link between FLE 
and improved behavior is moderated by increased literacy.  But locating 
reliable measures of each stage of the model and of the model overall 
has proven challenging. 
 
 113. Bell et al., supra note 84 at 1, 3. 
114. Id. at 3.  The researchers do not report any statistics about subjects who did not 
respond at follow-up, but the fact that more follow-up respondents were white and fewer 
were black than the comparison group is a hint that the respondents and nonrespondents 
differed.  Id. at 4 tbl.1.  The comparison group was not a randomized control group, and 
comparison group members were a bit older with more military experience than the 
members of the treatment group who responded to the follow-up survey.  Id. 
115. Id.  Cole & Shastry, supra note 106, at 30, find that additional years of 
education, but not mandated financial literacy education programs, increase retirement 
savings and investment income. 
 116. Controlling for other variables, the researchers found that soldiers who took 
the financial education course reported that they were less likely to use a formal budget 
and more likely to use an informal budget than soldiers who did not take the course.  Bell 
et al., supra note 84, at 19 & tbl.16. 
 
Financial Education  Financial Literacy  Good Financial Decisions & Behavior  
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1.  Accuracy of Measures of Exposure to Financial                              
Literacy Education 
As noted above, to avoid self-selection problems, Bernheim, Garrett, 
and Maki used a proxy measure for exposure to FLE in their 
investigation of the effect of high school financial education on adult 
retirement savings.117  The proxy was whether the state in which the 
respondent attended high school had a mandate requiring students to 
receive instruction in personal finance at the time the respondent was in 
high school.118  The authors found that residents schooled in states with 
mandates had more retirement savings.119  Their proxy measure appears 
to have some validity, in that adults who attended high school in “mandate” 
states were more likely to report having attended a class that included 
personal finance topics.  However, only about half of those in “mandate” 
states recalled taking such a course, and over a quarter of those in 
“nonmandate” states recalled taking such a course.  Further, state education 
departments report that “mandates” can mean as few as 25 to 50% of 
students are receiving FLE.120  These mandates thus do not appear to be a 
particularly accurate measure of exposure to FLE. 
Depending on the high school state distribution of respondents, the 
misclassification of even a state or two could substantially undermine 
the Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki results.  As these researchers acknowledge, 
there is conflicting evidence as to which states had mandates during the 
relevant time period.  Officials in New Mexico and Oklahoma, which 
the authors classified in their analysis as “mandate” states,121 responded 
to surveys conducted in 1985122 and 1990123 that they had no consumer 
education mandates and that fewer than 25% of their students took such 
a class by graduation.124  In the 1985 survey, officials in Pennsylvania, 
which the authors classified as a “nonmandate” state, responded that 
they had a consumer education mandate.125 
 
 117. Bernheim et al., supra note 105, at 436. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 462. 
 120. CHARLOTTE H. SCOTT, NAT’L COAL. OF CONSUMER EDUC., INC., 1990 NATIONAL 
SURVEY: THE STATUS OF CONSUMER EDUCATION IN UNITED STATES SCHOOLS GRADES K–
12, at 64–65 (1990), http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/ 
0000019b/80/22/d3/8a.pdf. 
 121. Bernheim et al., supra note 105, at 440 tbl.1. 
 122. DENNIS C. BRENNAN, JOINT COUNCIL ON ECON. EDUC., A SURVEY OF STATE 
MANDATES FOR ECONOMICS INSTRUCTION 1985–86, at 14–15 (1986), available at 
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/2
f/22/fa.pdf. 
 123. SCOTT, supra note 120, at 49. 
124. Id. at 65. 
 125. BRENNAN, supra note 122, at 3, 16. 
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Given that only 200 of the 1900 respondents in the study attended a 
high school that the authors had designated as covered by a mandate, 
results could be spurious, perhaps reflecting local economic conditions—
70% of respondents still lived in their high school state—rather than any 
effect of FLE.126  Indeed, as set forth above, a recent study attempting to 
replicate the Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki results using census data with 
a sample size of 3.6 million households found that household savings 
and investment income were correlated with state economic growth, and 
not with the imposition of financial education mandates.127 
A similar problem is at play in the research of Bernheim and Garrett 
on workplace “education” and saving for retirement.  As their measure 
of exposure to education, the authors used self-reports as to whether the 
respondent’s employer offered “seminars, professional assistance, or 
informative materials to assist with retirement planning.”128 Even 
accurate survey responses to this question would be a poor measure 
of FLE because the question did not distinguish between seminars and 
professional assistance.  During the time period relevant to the question, 
just over half of the employees offered workplace “education” were 
eligible to attend seminars, and a slightly higher proportion were given 
access to a financial planner or investment advice.129  Thus, although the 
study is frequently cited as demonstrating that workplace FLE boosts 
savings, the results might reflect the efficacy of professional retirement 
planning assistance in boosting savings.  This would not support the 
model of FLE that its promoters have in mind. 
2. Validity of Measures of Financial Knowledge,                                         
Skills, and Confidence 
A number of studies are cited as evidence for the first causal link of 
the model, between FLE and financial knowledge and skills.  One 
investigation, for example, found that taking a college course covering 
personal finance topics increases a consumer’s score on the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) investment knowledge test by 
three-quarters of a point out of ten possible points.130  However, the NASD 
 
 126. For further discussion of this study, see Caskey, supra note 110, at 9–10. 
 127. Cole & Shastry, supra note 106, at 16, 20–21. 
 128. Bernheim & Garrett, supra note 49, at 1493. 
129. Id. at 1491. 
 130. Tzu-Chin Martina Peng et al., The Impact of Personal Finance Education Delivered 
in High School and College Courses, 28 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 265, 271, 277 (2007). 
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test asks about basic facts—for example, whether “a reasonable average 
annual return that can be expected from a broadly diversified US stock 
mutual fund over the long run” is 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, or 25%.131  The 
Jump$tart survey asks similar factual questions, in addition to questions 
requiring simple addition, subtraction, and multiplication.132  Even the 
questions that consumers find most challenging and are least likely to 
answer correctly (for example, when interest rates fall, what should 
happen to bond prices?, or, if you put $100 in an account bearing interest 
at 20% per year and make no withdrawals, will you have more or less 
than $200 at the end of five years?)133 are factual or require mathematical 
calculations based on specified dollar figures, interest rates, and time 
periods. 
But the knowledge and skills evidenced by these tests are a far cry 
from what consumers need to compare two adjustable rate mortgages or 
calculate the amount that they should save for retirement—knowledge 
and skills that the Federal Reserve and the Department of Labor implicitly 
believe consumers should have.  For low-wage sector consumers, the 
literacy needed to score highly on these tests would not help them 
establish and follow household budgets; the income side of these 
consumers’ budget equations is too uncertain to be determined without 
probability calculations based on forecasts of macroeconomic factors 
that will affect their employers’ labor needs.  Moreover, consumers who 
answer “correctly” that the stock mutual fund annual return that can be 
expected is 10% are not knowledgeable so much as impressionable; past 
performance of the stock market cannot be used to predict future 
performance over long horizons, and a consumer who calculates retirement 
savings by assuming a 10% return is not engaging in good financial 
behavior as some economists see it.134 
As for the link between FLE and confidence, all research has 
concluded that participants gain increased financial confidence after 
taking a personal finance class.  One report quotes a consumer who had 
just completed the Financial Security in Later Life course: “‘It is 
amazing how a few changes made me feel empowered.  I made a “to do” 
list and I am determined to get them all checked off.’”135  This is an 
 
131. Id. at 283. 
 132. JUMP$TART COAL. FOR PERS. FIN. LITERACY, 2008 SURVEY OF PERSONAL 
FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG COLLEGE STUDENTS 1–6 (2008), http://www.jumpstart. 
org/fileindex.cfm (follow “Download” hyperlink next to “2008 Survey of Personal 
Financial Literacy Among High School Students”). 
 133. Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 54, at 6–7. 
134. E.g., Zvi Bodie, An Analysis of Investment Advice to Retirement Plan 
Participants, in THE PENSION CHALLENGE: RISK TRANSFERS AND RETIREMENT INCOME 
SECURITY 19, 24 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Kent Smetters eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2003). 
 135. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 42. 
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incomplete measure of the element of “confidence” in the FLE model, 
however, because it could indicate overconfidence rather than appropriate 
confidence.  In one study, half of the respondents who reported that their 
financial literacy was very high did not objectively test within the highest 
quartile of the sample, and over 15% were in the bottom quartile.136  For 
FLE to be effective, consumers’ confidence in the knowledge and skills 
that they believe they have gained must be justified.  To estimate whether a 
personal finance course produced an improved degree of confidence, 
empiricists would need to compare how well-calibrated consumers’ self-
assessments of knowledge and skills were before and after participation 
in FLE. 
3. Validity of Measures of Financial Behavior 
Studies cited as evidence for the proposition that FLE improves 
behavior use rough measures of behavior quality.  Most commonly, this 
research takes change in, or amount of, savings as its indicator of FLE’s 
efficacy.137  Other measures used to assess the quality of financial 
behavior derive from data in credit reports, such as number of credit 
cards, late payments, bankruptcies, foreclosures, and credit score.138  For 
studies of particular FLE programs, progress toward the goals of the 
program is the measure by which researchers typically measure behavior 
quality.139 
However, these measures may not accurately reflect the quality of 
financial behavior. What appears to be good financial behavior may be 
caused by inertia rather than literacy.  Savings and insurance may reflect 
employer decisions about default or matching contribution rates.  Credit 
reports contain inaccuracies and incomplete information, and although 
the majority of errors are inconsequential, the errors are not randomly 
distributed but rather vary by consumer age and income and share of 
 
 136. Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 54, at 23 tbl.4. 
137. E.g., Bernheim et al., supra note 105, at 462; Bernheim & Garrett, supra note 
49, at 1488; Lusardi, supra note 91, at 157. 
138. E.g., Elliehausen et al. II, supra note 63; Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, at 
3–5. 
139. E.g., Braucher, supra note 38, at 562–63 (relying on the goal of the program—
to increase bankruptcy repayment plan completion rates—to assess a debtor education 
program’s success); Hirad & Zorn, supra note 16 (relying on reductions in homeownership 
delinquency rates to measure the quality of counseling programs that aimed to lower 
mortgage delinquency rates). 
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minorities in the consumer’s home census tract.140  Further, credit report 
contents and resulting credit scores may not be good measures of behavior.  
Credit scores discount excellent financial behaviors by individuals who pay 
rent rather than a mortgage, place great weight on poor financial outcomes 
that may not be a result of poor financial behavior, and reflect good 
financial outcomes unrelated to literacy.141 
Goals of some FLE programs, such as increasing savings, avoiding 
bankruptcy, or reducing mortgage default, are not always financially 
wise.  Savings is not invariably the best use of money; investment in 
education or job training, housing, or a business might generate higher 
long-term returns.  Declaring bankruptcy and getting a fresh start might 
be optimal financial behavior for consumers who have lost their homes 
or jobs in a natural disaster.  Defaulting on an underwater mortgage—
meaning that the debt exceeds the market value of the house—can be 
financially advantageous, depending, for example, on whether the 
negative effect on the consumer’s credit report is smaller or greater than 
the positive effect on her balance sheet from the divestment of the 
debt.142 
Further, because an individual’s financial well-being is determined by 
meeting a web of interrelated goals and along many metrics, meeting 
one goal or improving one metric may have little effect on a consumer’s 
financial situation overall.  If FLE increases savings, this will be of no 
help in retirement if the money is poorly invested, diverted to crises 
precipitated by underinsurance, or spent to meet subsequent credit payment 
obligations.143  If FLE causes a reduction in late payments sufficient to 
increase credit scores, this may reduce prices paid for insurance and 
credit, but only if consumers understand different pricing structures for 
insurance and credit products and shop for the best price.144 
 
 140. Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, Accuracy in Credit Reporting, in BUILDING 
ASSETS, BUILDING CREDIT: CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 237, 237 
(Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2005); Robert B. Avery et al., Credit Report 
Accuracy and Access to Credit, 90 FED. RESERVE BULL. 297, 318–19 (2004). 
 141. Staten & Cate, supra note 140, at 240; Avery et al., supra note 140, at 315. 
142. E.g., Valentina Hartarska & Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Credit Counseling and 
Mortgage Termination by Low-Income Households, 30 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 227, 
239 (2005).  See also Ron Lieber, Thoughts on Walking Away from Your Home Loan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/your-money/mortgages/ 
14money.html (discussing pros and cons of defaulting on an underwater mortgage). 
 143. ROBERT I. LERMAN & ELIZABETH BELL, THE URBAN INST., FINANCIAL LITERACY 
STRATEGIES: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 1, 3–4 (2006), http://www.urban.org/ 
UploadedPDF/311352_financial_literacy.pdf. 
 144. Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem 
of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 831 (2006). 
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4.  Completeness of Measures of the Financial                                         
Literacy Education Model 
Policymakers cite academic work as support for the entire FLE model, 
although most work examines only one link, either between FLE and 
literacy or between literacy and behavior.  Tests of knowledge and skills 
such as the Jump$tart survey can demonstrate changed literacy, but not 
whether that literacy will change behavior.  On the other hand, observations 
of behavior change cannot demonstrate that changed financial literacy 
was the moderator. 
Investigations that look at both links falter if they measure the effect 
of FLE on financial literacy separately from the effect of financial 
literacy on financial behavior.  For example, research that demonstrates 
that economics training and workplace retirement education are associated 
with increased literacy and that increased literacy is associated with 
better financial behavior145 does not demonstrate causation from FLE to 
literacy to behavior.  Likewise, a finding that consumers on average 
increased their financial knowledge and improved their reported 
behaviors after participating in financial training146 does not show that 
these consumers used gained knowledge to improve their financial 
behavior. 
Instead, a model in which financial literacy is the moderator between 
FLE and financial behavior must be empirically validated.  Courchane 
and Zorn’s recent work is designed to test the entire model.147  If better 
data were available, selection effects eliminated, and valid measures of 
good financial behavior established, this design could form the basis for 
more complete research designs in the future. 
5.  Barriers to the Development of Better Measures 
Why have researchers used financial education, literacy, and behavior 
measures of questionable validity?  Demonstrating the effectiveness of 
the FLE model requires valid measures of each of these, as well evidence 
of causal links among them.  But the FLE model is underspecified in both 
technical and normative respects.  We lack consensus as to both “what 
 
145. See, e.g., Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 54, at 16. 
 146. Wiener et al., supra note 36, at 347. 
 147. Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, at 2. 
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should be measured” and “how it should be measured.”148  As researchers at 
the Federal Reserve have conceded, despite that agency’s own efforts to 
promote FLE, “In analyzing the efficacy of financial literacy programs, 
the primary challenge is defining and quantifying ‘success.’”149 
We have consensus on general principles of good financial behavior: 
where cost-effective, consumers should perform an adequate search for 
information about alternatives; should expend the needed resources to 
analyze those alternatives objectively; should base decisions on that 
analysis by trading off incommensurate costs and benefits where needed; 
should plan for the future and implement those plans through budgeting 
where necessary; should select financial products that meet needs 
without paying excessive prices or incurring excessive risk; should have 
a personal financial safety net through insurance, precautionary savings, 
or both; and once a safety net is established, should accept those risks 
that present a positive probability of higher returns rather than only low-
risk, low-return alternatives. 
But assessing whether a particular consumer has followed these 
principles before and after receiving FLE would require us to operationalize 
more concretely each of these principles.  Here, measurement instruments 
flounder because we have few benchmarks for evaluating financial 
decisions and behavior. 
First, we lack technical agreement about which financial decisions and 
behaviors are good ones.  Ask three different planning software programs 
how much to save for retirement and they will give you three different 
results.150  The common wisdom dispensed to consumers about investing 
for retirement is that they should invest in stocks when young and 
gradually shift to lower risk investments as they age, but respected 
economists disagree.151  In 2004, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan 
Greenspan publicly stated that consumers who took out fixed rate 
mortgages were leaving money on the table,152 but today we know that 
many consumers, and perhaps even the world economy, would be better 
off if they had declined adjustable rate mortgages that they can no longer 
afford. 
 
 148. Lyons et al., supra note 32, at 216. 
 149. Sandra Braunstein & Carolyn Welch, Financial Literacy: An Overview of 
Practice, Research, and Policy, 88 FED. RESERVE BULL. 445, 449 (2002). 
 150. Damon Darlin, A Contrarian View: Save Less and Still Retire with Enough, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007, at A1. 
151. E.g., Bodie, supra note 134, at 20–22. 
 152. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Understanding 
Household Debt Obligations, Remarks at the Credit Union National Association 2004 
Governmental Affairs Conference (Feb. 23, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040223). 
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Second, because consumer circumstances vary, behaviors that are 
welfare-enhancing for some are not for others.  Consumers who are not 
“in a financial position to maintain a healthy [bank] account” might be 
better off without one.153  In addition to paying overdraft charges, these 
consumers could suffer lowered credit scores that result in higher credit 
and insurance costs over the long-term.  For low-income families, 
reducing current consumption to accumulate savings may do more harm 
than good.154  Homeownership can also have a down side; it appears to 
lead to poorer neighborhood conditions, on average, for low-income 
consumers who were previously renters.155  Even a credit card over-the-
limit fee does not necessarily reflect a poor decision.  On financial 
grounds alone, paying for medical treatment and incurring the fee might 
be wiser than foregoing treatment and suffering health consequences that 
reduce earning potential.  These contextual factors mean that operationalized 
measures used to evaluate FLE must vary with the circumstances. 
Third and more fundamentally, we lack normative consensus about 
the quality of financial decisions and behavior.156  If financial decisions 
were just about money, if they were part of a game without real life 
consequences, we could develop decision rules that maximize wealth.  
But financial decisions do have consequences, requiring trade-offs 
among costs and benefits that are valued very differently by different 
consumers.  Normatively, the decision to purchase anything from Neiman 
Marcus might be poor.  Normatively, paying for a daughter’s wedding 
dress and incurring a credit card over-the-limit fee might be good.  The 
quality of any financial decision will depend on the values held by the 
consumer and a host of other unobserved situational, psychological, and 
social factors. 
 
 153. Angela C. Lyons & Erik Scherpf, Moving from Unbanked to Banked: Evidence 
from the Money Smart Program, 13 FIN. SERV. REV. 215, 229 (2004). 
 154. John Karl Scholz & Ananth Seshadri, The Assets and Liabilities Held by Low-
Income Families 28 (Oct. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available
at http://www.npc.umich.edu/news/events/access_assets_agenda/scholz_and_seshadri.pdf. 
 155. Shannon Van Zandt, Racial/Ethnic Differences in Housing Outcomes for First-
Time, Low-Income Home Buyers: Findings from a National Homeownership Education 
Program, 18 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 431, 465 (2007). 
 156. Braucher, supra note 38, at 563.  See generally Toni Williams, Empowerment 
of Whom and for What? Financial Literacy Education and the New Regulation of 
Consumer Financial Services, 29 LAW & POL’Y 226 (2007). 
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D.  Issues in the Interpretations of Results 
1.  “Findings” Suggestive of Bias 
The ideological belief that FLE is effective runs so deep that even 
well-respected researchers—or perhaps the editors who publish their 
works—at times misinterpret null results from their own studies as 
providing support for the FLE model. 
For example, a NASD investigation found that elderly consumer fraud 
victims were more financially literate, on average, than elderly nonvictims: 
A major hypothesis going into the survey was that investment fraud victims do 
not know as much about investing concepts as non-victims and would therefore 
score lower on financial literacy questions.  In fact, the study found the exact 
opposite: investment fraud victims scored higher than non-victims on eight 
financial literacy questions.  Additionally, a subgroup of “likely active investors” 
was created within the larger group of non-victims to determine if the difference 
in financial literacy scores had to do with the number of active investors in the 
non-victim group.  The investment victims outscored even this subgroup of 
likely active investors on the financial literacy questions.157 
Perhaps the experience of being victimized led to increased knowledge 
about investing.  Perhaps preexisting knowledge led to overconfidence, 
which led to victimization.  Perhaps the personality characteristics that 
lead some to seek and retain knowledge about investing also make them 
prone to falling for investment fraud schemes.  The causal mechanism is 
unclear, so all one can deduce from the data is that literacy is correlated 
with the incidence of fraud.  Instead, the study asserts that “[t]his finding 
suggests that financial literacy programs are necessary but probably not 
sufficient to prevent fraud.”158 
A study commissioned by the State of Washington to examine the 
financial literacy of victims of predatory home lending shows the same 
pattern, erroneously claiming that its data “strongly support[] the need 
for an education program that teaches financial concepts to consumers.”159  
The author tested consumers who had taken loans from a predatory home 
lender—“victim” group—against a sample from the general population.160  
Test results indicated that the former knew relatively more about home 
mortgages but less about investments.161  The author concludes that the group 
 
 157. NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, INVESTOR EDUC. FOUND., INVESTOR FRAUD 
STUDY FINAL REPORT 5–6 (2006), http://sec.gov/news/press/extra/seniors/nasdfraud 
study051206.pdf. 
158. Id. at 6. 
 159. DANNA MOORE, WASH. STATE UNIV. SOC. & ECON. SCI. RESEARCH CTR., 
SURVEY OF FINANCIAL LITERACY IN WASHINGTON STATE: KNOWLEDGE, BEHAVIOR, 
ATTITUDES, AND EXPERIENCES 15 (2003). 
160. Id. at 6–7. 
161. Id. at 25–26, 27 tbls.2 & 3. 
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who had taken loans with the predatory lender had “lower financial 
knowledge” and would benefit from a literacy program.162  The author 
does not explain how increasing knowledge of investments would help 
consumers avoid predatory lenders.  More plausible explanations of the 
data would be that either victims were made more vulnerable by their 
knowledge, perhaps due to overconfidence, or victims became more 
financially literate in the area of mortgages through their bad experiences. 
The conclusion in an evaluation of the Money 2000™ program that its 
“data lend support for the efficacy of financial literacy training in 
promoting improved financial behaviors” is similarly unfounded.163  The 
only behavior changes reported in the study are decreased debt for some 
participants, increased savings for some, and increased debt for some.  
Overall, the study reports that increased debt exceeded decreased debt.164  
Increased debt could be a good financial behavior, depending on the 
surrounding circumstances, but it could also be a poor financial behavior.  
The data do not support the conclusion that FLE is effective. 
2.  Low Statistical Significance 
Some findings cited as support for the FLE model lack statistical 
significance at the 0.05 level.  For example, preliminary results of 
Courchane and Zorn’s work designed to test the entire FLE model suffer 
from low statistical significance.  Courchane and Zorn merged several 
large data sets to test for links among FLE, financial knowledge and 
confidence, financial behavior, and creditworthiness—the study’s financial 
outcomes measure.165  Employing elaborate controls, these empiricists 
determined that respondents who reported learning more from financial 
seminars or classes—the study’s FLE measures—were relatively more 
confident in their financial knowledge.166  But preliminary analysis of 
the data did not demonstrate at the 0.05 level the relationships postulated 
in the FLE model between education and knowledge or, given high 
financial confidence, between various levels of financial knowledge and 
financial behavior.167  Further, FLE through seminars did not have a 
 
162. Id. at 60–61. 
 163. Osteen et al., supra note 36, at 5. 
164. Id. 
 165. Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, at 2. 
166. Id. at 11–13 tbl.9. 
167. Id. at 15 tbl.10, 17–19 tbl.11. 
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relationship to financial behavior demonstrable at the 0.05 level.168  
Although the data indicated that better financial behavior was associated 
with better outcomes, FLE had no direct relationship to outcomes at the 
0.05 level.169 
Admittedly, 5% is not some holy grail; “surely, God loves the .06 
nearly as much as the .05.”170  But some of the results here were obtained at 
the 0.12 to 0.99 level.171  Courchane and Zorn explain that their results 
cannot reject the possibility that FLE is not effective—the null 
hypothesis—at conventional confidence levels.172  But policymakers and 
others who cite their results are not always so careful.173 
3.  Limited Value of Reported Positive Effects 
A number of studies have reported positive effects that, 
methodological issues aside, might have been caused by FLE.  However, 
these improvements have tended to be very small, suggesting that even 
if FLE can work, it is not a cost-effective public policy. 
Elliehausen, Lundquist, and Staten have presented evidence of a small 
negative relationship between credit counseling, which they assert 
involves an FLE component, and debt.174  For consumers in middle and 
lower income groups, counseling was associated with a reduction in debt 
between 2% and 12%, although at higher incomes, counseling was 
associated with an increase in debt.175  However, although a 12% reduction 
in debt for low-income consumers appears to be cause for celebration, it 
is apparently not important enough to affect these consumers’ credit 
 
168. Id. at 19 tbl.11. 
169. Id. at 20–22 tbl.12, 27 tbl.13. 
 170. Ralph L. Rosnow & Robert Rosenthal, Statistical Procedures and the 
Justification of Knowledge in Psychological Science, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1276, 1277 
(1989). 
171. E.g., Hirad & Zorn, supra note 16, at 173 tbl.5A-2; Courchane & Zorn, supra 
note 16, at 15 tbl.10, 17–19 tbl.11, 22 tbl.12, 27 tbl.13. 
 172. Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, at 2.  Other research displays the same problem.  
For example, Gartner and Todd’s research on web-based FLE based on VISA’s FLE 
programs produced no statistically significant results.  Gartner & Todd, supra note 16, at 
9.  Almost none of the military study’s bivariate results show statistically significant 
differences for the group who received financial education between baseline prior to the 
education and at follow-up some time later.  Bell et al., supra note 84, at 7–14 tbls.3–12.  
Although some differences between the group who received the education and the 
comparison group were statistically significant at the 0.05 level, the difference cannot be 
attributed to having received the education because the group who received the education 
did not change from baseline prior to the course to follow-up after the course to any 
significant degree.  Id. 
173. E.g., Bernanke, supra note 16, at 4; Martin, supra note 18, at 9, 20. 
 174. Elliehausen et al. II, supra note 63, at 18. 
175. Id. at 20–22. 
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scores; the authors found that counseling was associated with virtually 
no increase in credit scores.176 
Tennyson and Nguyen, after contacting state education officials to 
confirm their state classifications, found improved financial literacy 
when particular FLE coursework was mandated for high school 
students.177  They divide data from the Jump$tart test of high school 
seniors into results from states with no FLE curriculum mandates, states 
with general mandates but no specific required course content, and the 
three states that require students to take specific coursework in personal 
finance.178  Controlling for other variables that they determined affect 
scores, they saw no differences in scores between students in the first two 
types of states, but that students in the states with specific coursework 
mandates scored an average 2.3 points higher.179  Examining particular 
questions, they found that these students scored no higher on the questions 
about spending, debt, or money management, but outperformed students 
in other states on questions about savings, investing, and income.180 
Unfortunately, financial gains accrued through knowledge about savings, 
investing, and income can be quickly lost through welfare-reducing 
spending, debt, or money management decisions.  Further, the gain in 
scores associated with mandated personal finance coursework amounted 
to a difference of less than one of the thirty-one questions on the test.181  
On average, students who attended schools with financial coursework 
mandates answered fewer than 60% of the questions correctly.182 
Wiener and his colleagues assessed the effectiveness of a voluntary 
program offered to consumers in bankruptcy in part by comparing the 
financial literacy levels of debtors who received financial training, 
debtors who did not, and nondebtors.183  All subjects were tested for 
their financial knowledge using twelve identical questions before the 
training date and three months later.  The group that received training 
was given course materials to bring home.184  It was also the only group 
 
176. Id. at 25–27. 
 177. Sharon Tennyson & Chau Nguyen, State Curriculum Mandates and Student 
Knowledge of Personal Finance, 35 J. CONSUMER AFF. 241, 259 (2001). 
178. Id. at 245–46, 247 tbl.2. 
179. Id. at 253. 
180. Id. at 254. 
181. Id. at 245, 253. 
182. Id. at 249. 
 183. Wiener et al., supra note 36, at 352. 
184. Id. at 350. 
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to increase their average score at a statistically significant level.185  The 
authors conclude that “[a]lthough the gains are modest, these data show 
strong quasi-experimental evidence that the financial literacy training 
program improves knowledge of appropriate saving, spending, and 
credit use.”186 
The score increase for trained debtors was 4%, equivalent to less than 
half a question.187  Given that the response rate of trained debtors to the 
post-test was 34% and of untrained debtors and nondebtors was 56% and 
71% respectively,188 and that when self-administering the post-test some 
of the trained debtors likely consulted their course materials, the 4% 
increase in the average trained debtor’s score might not reflect even a 
modest gain in financial literacy. 
The American Dream Demonstration project is routinely cited for its 
findings that “financial education has positive effects on savings and . . . 
courses need not be long to take advantage of the potential benefits.”189  
For “savers” who attended personal finance classes in this program, each 
hour of FLE up to eight hours was associated with a statistically 
significant average increase in monthly savings.190  Eight hours of education 
may have added about $125 to annual savings of “savers” during the 
program, in which the average participation lasted two years.191 
However, these results are reported only for the 56% of participants 
who had saved a net of at least $100 in the program.192  For these 
“savers,” an additional $125 each year could create a buffer that would 
help them cope with small financial shocks—missing a couple of days of 
work.  But many events that require consumers to dip into savings are 
much more expensive.  Further, the time spent in class and the increase 
in annual savings had to come from somewhere, and so results must be 
balanced against the reduction in hours available for work and in 
monthly spending experienced by these low-income consumers.193  On 
the whole, this FLE program may not have improved participant 
financial welfare. 
 
185. Id. at 363. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 358. 
188. Id. at 353. 
 189. SCHREINER ET AL., supra note 65, at 51. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at iv. 
192. Id. at iv, 32. 
 193. Scholz & Seshadri, supra note 154. 
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4.  Barriers to Better Interpretation of Results 
Neither data nor financial support for FLE research is easy to come by.  
FLE advocates want to spend every dollar on programs.  Government 
agencies have limited resources.  This leaves many researchers dependent 
on industry, which already collects a large amount of data about its 
customers’ payment histories, retirement savings contributions and 
investments, and other relevant statistics. 
The financial services industry has no interest in discovering that FLE 
is ineffective.  These programs help industry promote goodwill, penetrate 
new markets, cull out unqualified home loan applicants,194 and ideally, 
increase retirement savings under their management.  If FLE is not 
effective, industry loses its most potent argument against regulation—
that consumers are better off making their own financial choices and that 
impediments to good consumer financial decisionmaking are better 
addressed through FLE.  When industry is supplying the data, funding, 
or both, it cannot help but have an effect on the publicized research.  For 
example, although Gartner and Todd’s experiment using VISA’s Practical 
Money Skills for Life FLE program produced no statistically significant 
results, and the results that were produced were likely driven by self-
selection effects,195 VISA claims on its website that the experiment 
demonstrated that the program was an “effective medium of education 
for this sample population” and does not explain either the lack of 
statistical significance or the self-selection problem.196 
None of the researchers hid their studies’ weaknesses.  Most included 
a substantial discussion of research limitations.  But editors may obscure 
these caveats.  For example, one table of data on consumers’ intentions
to change their financial behavior is titled “Estimates of Changes in 
Retirement Savings Behavior,”197 even though the authors made plain in 
the text that few consumers followed up on their intentions.198  The “A 
 
 194. GEORGE W. MCCARTHY & ROBERTO G. QUERCIA, RESEARCH INST. FOR HOUS. 
AM., BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
HOMEOWNERSHIP, EDUCATION AND COUNSELING INDUSTRY 8–9 (2000), http://www. 
housingamerica.org/Publications/48506_BridgingtheGapBetweenSupplyandDemand.pdf. 
 195. Gartner & Todd, supra note 16, at 9. 
 196. Practical Money Skills for Life: Wells Fargo Case Study, http://www. Practical 
moneyskills.com/english/resources/about/WF_case_study.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2009). 
 197. Clark et al., supra note 36 (emphasis added). 
198. Id. at 62. 
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Little Knowledge Is a Good Thing” title of the Hirad and Zorn 
homeownership counseling study similarly may reflect a publisher’s 
choice; as noted above, the authors neither tested participant knowledge 
nor claimed participants gained any.199  Even without these sorts of 
invitations, FLE advocates and policymakers tend to see what they want 
to see in empirical work, and researchers have little ability to control 
that. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
What degree of effectiveness should appropriately be claimed for the 
current model of financial literacy education?  As yet, none, and the 
barriers to research that would soundly demonstrate effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness may be insurmountable.  But the conclusion is not that 
we must accept or reject FLE on ideological grounds alone and move on.  
Rather, we should search for alternative public policy models that 
recognize what financial education might realistically achieve.  At least 
two such models are suggested by the studies critiqued above. 
The first alternative policy model is suggested by Mandell’s 
examination of self-reported thrift among high school students.  Mandell 
found that students who took financial classes did not improve their 
scores on the Jump$tart exam but did report higher levels of thrift, and 
so he too conjectures, assuming students self-report accurately, a causal 
link between FLE and improved financial behavior unrelated to financial 
literacy.200 Courchane and Zorn come to a similar conclusion.201  
Likewise, although their reported finding that high school curriculum 
mandates increased savings has now been shown to be almost certainly 
incorrect,202 they too conjecture that FLE might change behavior not 
through increased knowledge or skills, but through “increased comfort 
with financial transactions and concepts.”203 
These academics present an intriguing possibility that it is not 
financial literacy, but a norm or rule of thumb of thrift that mediates 
between FLE and savings rates.  Rather than providing support for the 
current FLE model, these results suggest an alternative model of norms 
training leading to changed behaviors.  Financial norms education (FNE) 
would encounter the same challenges in developing appropriate norms 
that FLE faces in developing appropriate measures of good financial 
 
 199. Hirad & Zorn, supra note 16. 
 200. Mandell, supra note 47, at 7. 
 201. Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, at 30. 
 202. See discussion of the findings of Cole & Shastry, supra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
 203. Bernheim et al., supra note 105, at 450. 
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behavior—technical disagreement, appropriateness varying with context, 
and normative disagreement.  But FNE would be forced to address these 
head on in establishing the norms to be taught.  Wiener and his colleagues, 
among others, have been developing a financial education program that 
explicitly seeks to change participants’ attitudes or norms.204  These sorts 
of programs should be developed and examined further. 
For decisions and behavior that do not require a high degree of 
financial literacy, financial norms training could be effective.205  But 
adopting a norm can benefit consumers only when they can determine 
how to apply the norm to the context at hand.  Sometimes this will be 
easy—a norm of not investing a 401(k) in an employer’s stock is one 
that most consumers, if they have access to a 401(k), might follow.206  
But knowing a rule of thumb to “diversify assets” in which that 401(k) is 
invested is not enough if a consumer does not understand the basics 
about how assets differ.  Further, once a consumer decides how much to 
allocate to a mutual fund class, a norm of comparison price shopping 
will not be enough for her to determine which fund within the class has 
the lowest fees and expenses. 
These and other demands placed on consumers by society and the 
marketplace today require more than knowledge of and motivation to 
follow financial norms.  Thus, a norms model of financial education 
could be effective in improving consumer welfare only in conjunction 
with a reduction in the complexity of the consumer financial decisions 
and actions our society and marketplace require.  Such simplification 
would inevitably require substantive legal regulation of consumer 
financial products.  The variety, complexity, and sheer number of products 
available in the marketplace would need to be reduced.  Then, once 
finance products were structured with only a few moving parts, consumers 
might be able to apply rules of thumb learned in financial education 
classes correctly, and the quality of their decisions might rise. 
 
 204. Wiener et al., supra note 36, at 350. 
205. See Josh Wiener & Tabitha Doescher, A Framework for Promoting Retirement 
Savings, 42 J. CONSUMER AFF. 137, 146–50 (2008) (explaining ways in which norms can 
be harnessed to increase savings rates). 
 206. On the other hand, results thus far regarding financial education given to 
soldiers found that even teaching the soldiers the simple lesson not to take out payday 
loans or use pawn shops did not lead them to uniformly cease to do so, and once controls 
were added to the study, the financial training had no effect on the incidence of these 
poor financial practices among those who attended the training.  Bell at al., supra note 
84, at 14 tbl.12. 
WILLIS_FINAL_ARTICLE[1] 7/7/2009  4:53:42 PM 
 
458 
The second public policy model suggested by the research above 
stems from the studies of credit, retirement, and homeowner counseling.  
It is plausible that intervention by a counselor and individualized 
financial advice could improve consumer financial welfare.  This raises 
the possibility that rather than education, a better public policy response 
to consumer finance problems might be to support pro bono expert 
financial advisors.  Consumers would need sufficient education to select 
trustworthy and qualified advisors, but they would not need to perform 
difficult calculations, judge the value of information sources, or perform 
economic forecasting themselves. 
Providing pro bono financial advice and enforcing quality and 
integrity standards on the advisors would be costly to taxpayers.  But 
poor financial decisions by consumers and firms can also be costly to 
taxpayers—witness the cost to cities of cleaning up neighborhoods hit 
hard by mortgage foreclosures, the cost of emergency room medical care 
provided to those without adequate health insurance, and the cost to 
countries worldwide of the current financial crisis. 
The two proposals dovetail in some respects.  FNE might inculcate a 
norm of skepticism about claims made by sellers of financial products 
by explaining common scams and sellers’ financial incentives to steer 
consumers to products that generate the most revenue for the seller.  
Many “consumer rights” education programs include this in their curricula 
already, as do some debtor education programs.  A skepticism norm might 
be sufficient for simple financial matters, but for complex decisions, 
skepticism standing alone could lead to consumer fear without a way of 
distinguishing between scams and good financial products.  In turn, 
skepticism about the market’s offerings could lead consumers to seek 
out financial advisors for assistance.  Provided that these advisors are 
trustworthy, qualified, and affordable, the best FNE might espouse a 
norm of relying on these advisors when making important financial 
decisions. 
These policies and others should be tried and tested.  But until and 
unless stronger evidence emerges that the current model of financial 
literacy education is effective, policymakers and regulators should be 
circumspect in their use of it as a response to consumer financial problems.  
Researchers should be particularly cautious in the presentation of their 
findings, so that academic work will contribute to the public policy 
discussion empirical, rather than ideological, assessments of financial 
literacy education. 
 
 
